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WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM EDITH STEIN’S  
PHILOSOPHY OF WOMAN?1 
 
METTE LEBECH 
 
 
Abstract: This article addresses the question proposed in the title by describing the place of 
the philosophy of woman within the whole of Stein’s philosophy and by discussing the 
place of gender within Stein’s philosophical anthropology in particular. Some typical 
differences of the sexes as perceived by Stein are outlined and discussed in order to reflect 
on what answer to give to the question raised. 
 
 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Being a woman, as well as being a man, presents individuals with a task they share 
with only half of humanity. Because it is a task that probably essentially involves a 
relationship with those whose task it precisely is not, and also, accidentally so to 
speak, can free up incomparable creativity to the point of bringing children into the 
world, it is accompanied by joys and sorrows the depths of which stir every human 
heart and often break them. Whether the misbalance in existing reflections on 
gender, allowing for a disproportionate amount of reflection on woman compared 
to reflections on what it is to be a man, in itself bears a message about reality, or, 
indeed, is a misrepresentation of it, lies beyond the scope of these remarks. It 
remains that Stein’s reflections on woman in fact also contains a philosophy of 
(male) man, although both remain somewhat embryonic, and also sometimes 
marked by not being worked out in the same philosophical depth as the rest of her 
philosophical anthropology.2 
 To answer the question proposed in the title, I wish in the following to 
describe the place of the philosophy of woman within the context of the whole of 
 
1 This paper was originally given to the Newman Society in UCD under the title ‘female identity’ in 
the context of a man’s reflection (Tom Finnegan) on ‘male identity’, on 11 February 2009. 
2 Edith Stein, Woman, trans. by Freda Mary Oben, Collected Works of Edith Stein II, (Washington: ICS 
Publications, 1996). This work does not accurately reflect the texts assembled in the critical edition in 
Edith Stein Gesamtausgabe, Herder, vol. 13, which forms the basis for the present study. Sarah 
Borden’s, ‘Edith Stein’s Understanding of Woman’, International Philosophical Quarterly, (46,  2006), 
171–90, explains in detail how the two volumes relate. Stein’s work on woman, however, must be 
read in the context not only of the contemporary lectures on education reprinted in Bildung und 
Entfaltung der Individualität (ESGA vol. 16) but also in the context of the later concluding lectures 
from her time at the Marianum: Der Aufbau der menschlichen Person and Was ist der Mensch?, respectively 
vol. 14 and 15 in ESGA. Unfortunately, these important works are not yet translated into English. 
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Stein’s philosophy (Section II). This will lead us to discuss the place of gender 
within the human person as Stein presents it in her early and later philosophical 
anthropology (Section III) and also the typical differences of the sexes as portrayed 
by Stein (Section IV). We shall then finally be in a position to ask some questions 
regarding Stein’s understanding of gender in its theological dimensions (Section V), 
which, although we may not be able to answer them fully, may serve as an opening 
of the field — in case we are in need of such a one to supplement the one we 
inevitably have ourselves by virtue of the task with which our gender confronts us. 
We shall conclude by reflecting on what to learn from Stein on these issues. 
 
II 
THE PLACE OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF WOMAN WITHIN  
THE WHOLE OF STEIN’S PHILOSOPHY 
 
Stein wrote about woman because she was asked to, not so much because she had 
an urge to do so. She did so at a time when she was working towards re-establishing 
a career in philosophy, after having left it aside to teach German and Latin in the 
gymnasium for girls run by the Dominican nuns in Speyer. Requests for talks kept 
coming, and Stein kept answering these requests: in doing so she reached a very 
large public by means of a popular style of thought otherwise uncharacteristic of 
her. She never wrote a book on the topic, nor did gender figure prominently in her 
more substantial lectures on philosophical anthropology published as the Structure of 
the Human Person.3 Stein’s ‘philosophy of woman’ is thus a prominent topic in her 
circumstantial writings — but it is not in any way her most substantial contribution 
to philosophy, as one can sometimes be led to think by superficial acquaintance 
with the scholarship surrounding Stein’s writings. 
 Her career as a lecturer on the issue took off in particular after she had 
given her ‘The Ethos of Women’s Professions’ in Salzburg on 1 September 1930, at 
a meeting of the Association of Catholic Academics, the first of the annual 
‘Salzburgerwochen’ (a very well established institution still in existence). For this 
occasion she had first been offered to address the more fundamental topic of ‘the 
Ethos of Christian Professions’, something she said she accepted only because ‘that 
topic particularly attracted’ her.4 ‘But then the people in Salzburg decided it was 
essential to address the women’s theme separately, so I consented to change’: 
Dietrich von Hildebrandt took over the other topic, and this process had given her 
food for thought.5 She ended her talk in Salzburg in the following manner:  
 
I would like to raise a question that comes to mind again and again: the convention 
program clearly designates the various kinds of professions (the doctor, the priest, 
etc.). What need was there for a special category of women’s professions? Besides, 
why are there such frequent discussions on women’s professions but hardly any on 
men’s professions? Is not man like woman aware of the coexistence and potential 
conflict between individual tendencies and masculine tendencies? Is it not also true 
of man that his nature is or should be a co-determining factor for the selection and 
formation of his vocation? Furthermore, do we not also here find the opposition 
 
3 See, supra, n. 2. 
4 Self Portrait in Letters, letter 57, to Adelgundis Jägerschmidt, ESGA II, brief 98, Juli/August 1930. 
5 Ibid. 
  
217  
between fallen and redeemed nature? I believe it would be very beneficial if at 
some time these questions would be considered seriously and thoroughly. For a 
wholesome collaboration of the sexes in professional life will be possible only if 
both achieve a calm and objective awareness of their nature and draw practical 
conclusions from it.6 
 
The circumstantial nature of Stein’s work on woman, (ESGA 13 contains 10 more 
or less substantial articles on the topic, most of them solicited as a result of this first 
one), makes us look towards the motivation that existed among the public for 
asking her to deal with this particular topic. A brief glance on the times in which 
these lectures were solicited reveals that two weeks after her first lecture on the 
‘woman-question’, on September 14 1930, 18,3 % of the votes were secured by the 
Nazi party during an election for the German Reichstag (107 deputies). The Nazi 
understanding that women had to play a role primarily in the home and as child 
bearers, which, to judge from this result, had a significant amount of subscribers, 
together with the depression of 1929 issuing in massive unemployment figures, 
conspired to create an atmosphere where the question of women’s professions, 
after the great victories of the women’s movement in the first and second decade of 
the twentieth century, again became a real question. It was in fact this question Stein 
was asked to address by her public, and she therefore rightly understood her 
lectures about woman as addressing a political question, ‘eine brennende 
Gegenwartsfrage’.7  
 It was for Stein not only the reductionist Nazi subordination of women to 
the service of men in the private sphere, but also the competing ‘Bolchevist’ ideal of 
empty equality of all human beings reduced to their force of labour that needed 
correction. What was needed in order to counteract both, and respond to the quest 
they grew from, was the education of the whole, real human person, so that all, men 
and women alike, could reach their full human potential. To Stein the question of 
the education and professions of women highlighted the much more important 
question of the reality of the human being: the human being could not be a mere 
result of social factors shaping it arbitrarily for purposes that had nothing to do with 
its own being: conceiving it as such would create the highly instable possibility of 
totalitarian exploitation, as indeed it in fact did. Gender, because it forms part of the 
concrete reality of the human being, thus provided an opportunity to argue that this 
reality would have to be taken into consideration and find an expression through 
the education and work offered for the development of the human being by society. 
 To Stein this reality meant first and foremost that women should be allowed 
to be educated by women (most education of girls in Germany were at the time in 
the hands of male teachers), so that women’s potential as women could be reached, 
given the teachers’ function as role model and their personal experience of living 
the life of a woman. That such education of the whole person (inclusive of gender 
and not despite it) was the best defence against both ideologies rests on the fact that 
each of these ideologies in their own way denied the particular being and value of 
the human being as such and of women in particular, instead understanding the 
being and value of human beings to rely on race, power, society or the force of 
labour. Education of the whole human being meant an affirmation of the dignity, 
 
6 Woman, p. 57, translation adapted. Die Frau ESGA 13, p. 29. 
7 ESGA 13, p. 1. 
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person, humanity, gender and individuality of every human individual, i.e., also of 
women; and a challenge to the body, soul and personality of the individual. Since 
Stein in several cases was asked to address the woman question in particular, a 
question she saw as reflecting this deeper political and moral problem, she 
addressed that question specifically, but always in a manner that pointed to the 
larger one of the education of the human person for its own good, the good of 
society, and for an eternal destiny.  
 Stein had always been interested in the human person, its relationship to its 
fellows, to communities, to the state and to religion. The philosophical 
anthropology developed in her early explicitly phenomenological period (On the 
Problem of Empathy, Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities, An Investigation Concerning 
the State and Introduction to Philosophy)8 gave her a foundation for the lectures on 
woman. The popular nature of these latter, however, means that they contain less 
sustained philosophical analysis and as a consequence make concessions to general 
opinion, which for the sake of brevity and political efficacy no doubt were necessary 
and indicated. For these reasons, perhaps, these lectures also made her famous, they 
were hotly debated and contested and are still widely read, probably because they 
are easy to read, much easier than Stein’s substantial contributions to philosophy. 
They also give a rounded insight into a topic that is both highly personal and highly 
context-dependent. When Stein again obtained a foothold in academic work, she 
abandoned the topic, and in its place trod the systematic development of a Christian 
education theory based on a philosophical anthropology informed by her Catholic 
faith, a topic much closer to the centre of her natural interests.  
 Should we understand the lectures on woman as being opportunistic, 
therefore? That is probably stretching the argument too far: Stein seized the 
opportunities handed to her with the intent of engaging fulltime in academic work 
again. And she brought her political perspicacity to bear on the question, which she 
addressed in a highly reflective manner still accessible to the non-philosopher.  Her 
characteristic wisdom and profundity, however, also gleams through the style of 
thought, and reveals an earnest courage to put herself on the line in the concrete 
situation that was the fatally overheated social climate of Germany in the thirties. 
 
III 
THE PLACE OF GENDER  
 WITHIN THE HUMAN PERSON 
 
Let us thus, before we look closer at her understanding of female and male identity 
in these lectures, move to address the question of the role of gender within her 
philosophical anthropology, which forms the philosophical context of her well-
known public appearances. 
 From her early works to the later twin-works The Structure of the Human Person 
and What is the Human Being?9 Stein’s development as a philosopher is that of a 
phenomenologist primarily interested in constitutional issues (i.e. how we come to 
identify our experience as we do), who under the influence of classical and medieval 
philosophy, particularly Aristotle and Aquinas, turn her attention increasingly 
towards eidetics, i.e. towards the essential structures of the objects experienced and 
 
8 ESGA 5, 6, 7 and 8. 
9 ESGA 14 and 15 
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of experiences as such. There is, therefore, a strict correlation — one might even 
say convertibility — between her early phenomenology, prolonging Husserl’s, and 
her late philosophy, often characterised as ‘Scholastic’. Whether the latter 
description is accurate,  or not, is immaterial in this context (this depends on how 
one defines Scholasticism); what matters is that we are talking about a philosophical 
anthropology thought through in two complementary and convertible modes. The 
first mode unfolds amidst a conscious assessment of the complex web of social 
construction,10 the second mode is supported by the teachings of the Catholic 
Church (understood by Stein to occupy a privileged place in the web of social 
construction because of its relation to Jesus Christ). The place of gender in the early 
and in the later anthropology reflects this convertibility.  
 In On the Problem of Empathy (1916) Stein uses the word ‘type’ to designate 
that as which the ‘I’ sees itself, in so far as it sees itself as of the same kind as the 
‘you’.11 This type is not fixed, but can be varied, even at will, in the same way as 
eidetic variation involves wilfully re-imagining the entity under investigation in 
order to assess its limits. I am thus able to conceive myself as fulfilling various 
types; ‘person’, ‘human individual’, ‘woman’, ‘lecturer’, ‘member of the Irish 
Philosophical Society’, each of which captures me under a certain aspect. I can 
indeed also see myself as ‘animal’ or ‘thing’, which captures still more abstract 
aspects of me. In Stein’s early work the ‘type’ is that according to which I interpret 
the experience of ‘you’ and ‘I’ as equivalent or analogous, and hence the means by 
which my world as socially constructed is constituted as objective. The type or types 
I take to be mine define who co-constitutes my world. Woman and man are thus 
types according to which I constitute myself in the world and according to which I 
compile and compare my experience from and with others of the same type. It is 
normal and rational to think that the types of ‘woman’ and ‘man’ fit into the more 
general type of the human being or person (since the species of human beings 
comprise two sexes), but normality or rationality are both normative for 
constitution, and nothing can force constitution if it isn’t occurring or thought to 
ought to occur. This means that although constitution inclusive of the two genders 
is normal and seen as such, it may not occur. What may occur in stead could rely on 
one type, rather than another, so that the human implicitly is reduced to one of the 
genders.12 What the content of the types of man and woman are, however, apart 
from them being possible forms according to which the I can identify itself, is not 
made clear in Stein’s early work. A means of distinguishing them from ‘social types’ 
(which she later will explore) seems absent: ‘age, sex, occupation, station, 
nationality, generation’ are all considered ‘general experiential structures to which 
the individual is subordinate’, and in fact distinguished by their pertaining to the 
 
10 Developed primarily in On the Problem of Empathy and Philosophy of Psychology and the Humanities 
(ESGA 5 and 6, the latter forthcoming). See also my, ‘Study-guide to Edith Stein’s Philosophy of 
Psychology and the Humanities’, Yearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society (2004), pp. 40–76, available on the 
web in the NUIM e-print archive. 
11 III, 5, in particular (b). 
12 For further reflection on Stein’s understanding of ‘type’ see my, On the Problem of Human Dignity. A 
Hermeneutical and Phenomenological Investigation (Würzburg: Königshausen und Neumann, 2009), pp. 
252–6. Such reduction is often happening, and is, one might think, at the root of much gender 
discrimination. 
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spiritual realm as distinct from the natural realm.13 Such experiential structures may 
erect boundaries: ‘I cannot fulfil what conflicts with my own experiential structure. 
But I can still have it given in the manner of empty representation.’14 This means 
that if I identify with a type that excludes another (as ‘man’ and ‘woman’ might), I 
will have to put imagination to work to emptily represent that which ‘my’ type 
excludes. As experiential structure also is the presupposition for the formation of 
communities, my ‘type’ also determines the types of communities to which I can 
belong.15 
 16 years later, in The Structure of the Human Person (1932), Stein does 
distinguish between social types and the inborn predispositions that are ultimately 
shaping the person from within his or her self-constitution. She sees the inborn 
types as being those of the human, the gender, the specific and the individual, so 
that these types discovered in each individual are fundamental to the social types, 
which in turn reform what is already formed.16 Education, in other words, does not 
invent the human being: it forms it in accordance with a pre-established individual 
programme, visible and intuitable in the individual human being whose humanity, 
gender, specificity and individuality gives him or her concrete dimensions. She 
tentatively calls gender a part-species (Teilspecies), in which individuals find 
themselves from birth. But then she says the following:  
 
Also the male and the female gender (männliche und weibliche Eigenart) is something that 
first must unfold to actuality in the course of life; that happens again under the 
influence of the environment, and so is, in all later stages of development, that which 
meets us and which could be designated as the ‘manly’ or the ‘womanly’, probably a 
social type, in which what is determined by ‘the environment’ and the ‘specificity’ 
fundamental to the social formation are very difficult to distinguish. (Thus is explained 
the quarrel over whether male and female gender are specific differences, i.e., 
fundamental to social formation, or whether they are only typical, i.e., results of social 
formation.)17  
 
‘Man’ and ‘woman’ are in other words types, the natural foundation of which is lost 
in constitution, as this happens against the background of the spiritual achievements 
we call culture. We thus only know what it is now, and how it matters now, and that 
only provisionally and in so far as it really matters; we can never know how it 
‘originally’ was or is in ‘its purity’ as such purity does not and never did exist. 
 
IV 
THE TYPICAL DIFFERENCES  
AS PERCEIVED BY STEIN 
 
This point must be kept in mind when we read the slightly earlier popular lectures 
on woman. It justifies the view that these lectures must be seen as a political 
intervention, indeed as Stein’s most consciously political intervention, her strategic 
 
13 On the Problem of Empathy, IV, 7 (b). That means they are spiritual realities, not natural ones as 
indeed all concepts are: products of a spiritual process, meant to understand natural reality. 
14 Ibid. 
15 Philosophy of Ps. And the Hum. II, 4, (a) 
16 Structure of the Human Person, VIII, II, 4. 
17 Ibid., own translation. 
  
221  
attempt to counteract the influence of Nazism on what she regarded the most holy 
of tasks: education. That gender is both presupposed for its social interpretation 
and a result of it means that any theorising about it is observation as much as it is 
proposal. From this stems the difficulty of talking about the subject. 
 The double basic difference between the sexes that Stein most often returns 
to, and thus both observes and proposes to observe, is that of men being primarily 
focussed on the factual (Sachliches) in a life that develops specific talents (or one 
specific talent) to the point of excellence at the expense of other talents and a sense 
of the wholeness of the person, while women focus primarily on the personal and 
have an urge towards developing the entire person (in themselves and in others) in a 
harmonious manner. Thus she will, for example, say the following in her ‘Woman’s 
Value in National Life’ (14 April 1928, given to the association of women teachers in 
Bayern): 
 
Man appears more objective: it is natural for him to dedicate his faculties to a 
discipline (be it mathematics or technology, a trade or business management) and 
thereby to subject himself to the precepts of this discipline. Woman’s attitude is 
personal; and this has several meanings: in one instance she is happily involved with 
her total being in what she does; then she has particular interest for the living, 
concrete person, and indeed, as much for her own personal life and personal affairs 
as for those of other persons. 
 
Through submission to a discipline, man easily experiences a one-sided development. In 
woman, there lives a natural drive towards totality and self-containment. And, 
again, this drive has a twofold direction: she herself would like to become a complete 
human being, one who is fully developed in every way; and she would like to help 
others to become so, and by all means, she would like to do justice to the complete 
human being wherever she has to deal with persons.18 
 
The flipside to these positive characteristics of both sexes are certain exaggerations, 
which Stein attributes to the fall described in Genesis forming part of the Christian 
faith. For the man this flipside is an exaggeration of the objective attitude: a 
tendency to dominate and bring not only his own forces but also those of his 
surroundings, and in particular those of his wife, to serve his particular purpose (the 
purpose which he himself also serves), which often is too small or too particular for 
the human beings involved to flourish. This purpose, indeed, does not make any 
sense if it were not because it was dictated by the further purpose of the flourishing 
of the human person. The result of his drive towards objectivity, efficiency and 
domination is thus often instrumentalisation. 
For the woman the flipside is an overemphasis of the personal. This can 
take the form of an exaggerated interest in the self, its moods, desires and tastes; it 
can also take the form of curiosity, the exaggerated (but superficial) interest in 
everything personal pertaining to the other (gossip); and it can finally take the form 
of domination, in which case it mostly happens by means of manipulation: 
emotional or motivational. 
 
Excess of interest in both her own and in the other’s personality merge in feminine 
surrender, the urge to lose herself completely in a human being; but in so doing, 
 
18 Woman, p. 255. 
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she does justice neither to self nor to the humanity of the other, and at the same 
time, becomes unfit for exercising other duties.19 
 
The final, and most lethal (to herself) flipside of woman’s specificity is thus her 
tendency to surrender herself completely in love, to another human being. If this 
other human being is a man who displays the flipside of the male, he will encourage 
the surrender in order to dominate, and the characteristic disaster of many human 
relationships thus spins out of control. 
 Although Stein does not propose a ‘cure’ for the masculine overemphasis 
on the objective, except the reflection on its value, we might feel free to think it 
would involve the conscious exercise of empathy and involvement in all areas where 
a personal attitude is particularly called for: childrearing, understanding of personal 
relationships, seeing things from other people’s perspectives, and thus gaining an 
understanding of the particular role (and indeed of the particularity of the pursuit) 
that one’s own task has in a greater whole. 
 Stein does, however, propose a cure for the feminine overemphasis on the 
personal (and given the political scope of the lectures, we cannot be too surprised): 
 
A good natural method for this [overemphasis] is thoroughly objective work. 
Every work, no matter of what kind, whether housework, a trade, science or 
anything else, necessitates submitting to the laws of the matter concerned; the 
whole person, thoughts, just as all moods and dispositions, must be made 
subordinate to the work. And whoever has learned this, has become objective, has 
lost something of the hyper-individuality and has attained a definite freedom of 
self; at the same time she has attained an inner depth — she has attained a basis of 
self-control.20 
 
V 
QUESTIONS TO AND ABOUT STEIN’S  
UNDERSTANDING OF GENDER 
 
Stein admits of a ‘certain precedence’ of man over woman, which she bases on her 
understanding of Catholic doctrine.21 She claims this precedence stems from two 
facts: that man was created before woman and that Christ became a man, born of a 
woman. Both of these arguments are defective, however, as the fact that the animals 
were created before man does not make them superior, and as God might have 
chosen the least favoured to shame the stronger. But there is little doubt that the 
arguments were regarded as valid in Stein’s surroundings, and that the signal she 
sends by using them secures (in principle) the backing of Theologians, Christians, 
Nazis and Conservatives alike, to whom this certain precedence was the backbone 
of the known world order. Stein was not a revolutionary —  she was much too 
cautious about sudden social changes for that (women had only obtained the vote 
in 1919, three years after she defended her doctoral dissertation, and she was now 
observing how many women contributed towards bringing the Nazis to power). 
Moreover, Stein had a message —  that of the importance of education, education 
 
19 Woman, p. 257, translation adapted. 
20 Woman, p. 257. 
21 ‘Beruf des Mannes und der Frau nach Natur- und Gnadenordnung’, Die Frau ESGA, p. 59, 62; 
Woman, p. 61, 65. See also, ‘Probleme der neueren Mädchenbildung’, Die Frau, p. 175. 
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of the whole person, man and woman as concrete individuals and gendered human 
beings exposed to each other and to each other’s opinions about each other —  and 
she had to try by this message to preserve the possibility of adequate education in 
the future, even by the means of providing arguments relying for their validity on 
popular acclaim.  
She balanced this precedence against a certain superiority of women over 
men as regards the ability to be united with God: she claimed women’s capacity for 
surrender prepared them particularly well for this union.22 Here again, the Christian 
heritage provides us with arguments to the contrary: the surrender of Christ, the 
man, to the Father’s will is surely no less valid than that of Mary’s, although it may 
engage a certain type of sexual imagination less well. It also is not of less 
consequence for the one involved: Christ gave his body for us, much like a mother, 
as indeed mother Julian says. In the process he was destroyed and died for us, and 
rose by the ontological miracle of Trinitarian love, again for us. On his surrender we 
all depend. 
It remains a fact, perhaps, that Stein attempted, in these her most political 
interventions, to catch the prevalent imagination, however marred, and make it 
work towards a goal that in the circumstances may well have been regarded by Stein 
as justifying the means: the goal of education, the education of both sexes by both 
sexes, as human persons and human beings, the eternal destiny of which far 
outweigh their importance as gendered beings. 
It is interesting to note that in Stein’s theological anthropology, which 
assembles all the dogmatic declarations that can elucidate the question of the book’s 
title: What is the Human Being?, gender plays no role at all: Stein seems to have been 
unable (or unwilling?) to find any dogmatic declarations about the issues.23  
 What thus is at the forefront of the public imagination that engaged her to 
speak on the topic of women’s identity, and men’s, recedes to total insignificance 
when engaging the more profound reflections, also at the dogmatic level. Although 
this may be surprising, it also seems to set us free for the reflections needed on our 
common humanity. Stein responded to what she was asked to do, and took her 
listeners beyond the ‘brennende Gegenwahrtsfrage’ to a depth where the Spirit is equally 
available to all.  
 
VI 
CONCLUSION 
 
It seems to me that what we can learn from Stein’s philosophy of woman (and man) 
is first and foremost that gender remains a feature of the concrete real human 
person, but that this person’s importance far outweighs the importance of gender. 
Gender is in some sense a transitory focus, a changing type that allows for the 
building of individuality and occupies a definite place in the structure of the 
 
22 E.g. Die Frau, p. 77. She also, and perhaps more importantly, regarded the relation between 
mother and child as the purest of human relationships, their archetype. The mother is superior, of 
course, only in the sense that she is not superior, and her relation with her children relies precisely on 
this enabling putting herself at their disposal. That there can be precedence in putting oneself last 
also is the message of the Gospel. 
23 Was ist der Mensch? ESGA vol. 15 is a dogmatic anthropology commenting on Denzinger, i.e., 
dogmatic declarations from close to 2000 years of Church history, all relating to who or what the 
human being is. See also, Beate Beckman’s introduction to this work.  
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individual human person. As a focus, however, it remains indispensable to do 
justice to the concrete nature of the human being. Its significance, nevertheless, 
must remain subordinate to that of the human being and that of the person, which 
alone constitute types that allow for the formation of the whole human being. This 
again may mean that we in fact cannot know exactly what it is to be a man, or to be a 
woman: both express the relational dimension of the human being, its standing in 
relation to something other than itself, but it is not a relation that ultimately can be 
completely understood in its specificity because it has no fixed content independent 
of cultural interpretation of its symbolic value. If it has some content along the lines 
given by Stein: the high versus the whole development, the objective versus the 
personal attitude, both of these polarities seem to tend to serve the purpose of 
correcting, rather than to justifying concrete development along these lines, and 
indeed to halt the development of attitudes that ultimately are detrimental to the 
human person as such, whether as such or as living in community with others. In 
this way the outlining of the differences is helpful: it is the attempt to reduce the 
individual characteristics of the human being to its gender specificity, or let gender 
expectations determine how we allow individuality to develop that is unhelpful at 
least to some, and therefore not of benefit to all. That social roles are in need of 
negotiation at all times is justified by the fact that the ultimate reasons for the 
justifiability of the outcome of these negotiations can only be the common good 
which is a good for all and every individual. We live to learn about that, it seems. 
In so far as gender in fact is a type that does not allow for the identification 
of the whole human being it is no coincidence that Stein does not engage the issues 
of sexual difference in her substantial philosophical works: it is because what can be 
said about it cannot find an expression that does not simply have the purpose of 
correcting the spin induced by not being one with the other as much as is necessary 
for the spiritual union of love; the eternal destiny of human beings. That gender is a 
circumstantial issue, however, does not mean that it is without political importance 
to address it, and that this is required whenever the opposition between the sexes is 
so disturbed as to inflame the imagination of whole peoples and stir them into 
stereotypical action, in a manner that inevitably is destructive since it falls short of 
enabling the education and development of the whole of the human person. Much 
talking is needed for us to redress each other. It does not mean either that surrender 
is not what we all have to learn from each other in order to live in Christ, broken as 
bread for the world. It just means that our imagination, so often informed by 
sexuality, must be broken along with us in order to set tenderness free.   
 
 
 
 
